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TRADE SECRET LITIGATION AND FREE 
SPEECH: IS IT TIME TO RESTRAIN  
THE PLAINTIFFS? 
Elizabeth A. Rowe* 
Abstract: Trade secret misappropriation litigation is often criticized for its 
negative effects on competition and speech. In particular, some accuse 
plaintiff trade secret owners of filing complaints for the purpose of run-
ning competitors out of business, or restraining individuals from discuss-
ing matters which are unfavorable. This Article enters the discussion to 
critically assess whether there is reason to consider restricting these ac-
tions. It concludes that trade secret litigation on the whole does not inap-
propriately impinge on speech rights. Even if certain cases come closer to 
offending defendants’ free speech rights, these occasions and the con-
cerns they raise are not unique to trade secret law. Instead, they stem 
from the broader issue of litigation misuse in civil and intellectual prop-
erty cases. Indeed, there are particular reasons not to be overly con-
cerned about trade secret actions because existing litigation safeguards, 
when properly applied, minimize the risk of free speech incursions. 
Introduction 
 Trade secret misappropriation lawsuits are often criticized for their 
negative effects on competition and speech. In particular, some critics 
accuse plaintiff trade secret owners of filing complaints for the pur-
poses of running competitors out of business or restraining individuals 
from discussing matters which are unfavorable to the plaintiff.1 This 
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often retaliate by suing the speaker for tortious acts such as defamation or disclosure of 
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Article assesses whether there is reason to consider restricting trade se-
cret holders’ litigation rights in light of free speech criticisms. The Arti-
cle is not about application of the First Amendment in trade secret 
cases.2 Rather, it takes on the separate question of whether trade secret 
litigation results in a chilling effect that so offends free speech values as 
to justify restricting such litigation. 
 The Article concludes that trade secret litigation on the whole 
does not inappropriately impinge on speech rights. The fundamental 
nature of trade secret rights, in particular the underlying proprietary 
and corporate privacy interests, helps illustrate why free speech issues 
do not pose an overriding concern sufficient to justify restrictions on 
trade secret litigation. Even if certain cases come closer to offending 
defendants’ speech rights, these occasions and the concerns they raise 
are not unique to trade secret law. Instead, they stem from the broader 
issue of litigation misuse in civil and intelletual property cases. Accord-
ingly, any modifications are best addressed in the context of general 
litigation reform rather than singling out trade secret cases. Indeed, 
there are particular reasons not to be overly concerned about trade se-
cret actions because existing litigation safeguards, when properly ap-
plied, minimize the risk of free speech incursions. 
A. The Scientology Cases 
 One set of trade secret misappropriation cases probably best rep-
resents the kind of objectionable conduct that potentially interferes 
with free speech. The Church of Scientology (“Scientology”) has filed 
numerous lawsuits through the entity that owns its intellectual property, 
Religious Technology Center (“RTC”), to prevent revelation of unpub-
lished writings of Scientology founder L. Ron Hubbard. Scientology has 
continuously fought the revelation of its trade secrets, claiming that its 
secret Operating Thetan or Advanced Technology documents could be 
misunderstood by outsiders who have not taken Scientology courses to 
achieve “higher consciousness.”3 The Scientology cases provide snap-
                                                                                                                      
Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 196, 201 (2002) (“In order to silence their employees and 
investor critics, corporations have filed lawsuits under a variety of legal theories, including 
. . . trade secrets . . . .”). 
2 Many scholars have already addressed this issue. See infra note 61 and accompanying text. 
3 Church of Scientology Protects Secrets on the Internet, Aug. 26, 1995, http://www.cnn.com/ 
US/9508/scientology/. 
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shots of a plaintiff using trade secret litigation4 in an objectionable 
manner. 
 In the Religious Technology Center v. Lerma litigation, the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia determined in 1995 that “the 
primary motivation of RTC in suing [the defendants] is to stifle criticism 
of Scientology in general and to harass its critics.”5 The court noted that 
“[a]s the increasingly vitriolic rhetoric of its briefs and oral argument 
now demonstrate, the RTC appears far more concerned about criticism 
of Scientology than vindication of its secrets.”6 The court also concluded 
that RTC was attempting not just to control the expression of Scientol-
ogy’s ideas, but also all comments about those ideas.7 
 When RTC first appeared before the court in Lerma seeking ex 
parte motions for a temporary restraining order and to permit seizure 
of Lerma’s property, the court allowed the motions.8 As the litigation 
progressed and the court became aware of RTC’s motives, however, the 
court expressed regret at having made those rulings.9 Specifically, the 
court found: 
[T]he motivation of plaintiff in filing this lawsuit against the 
[Washington] Post is reprehensible. Although the RTC brought 
the complaint under traditional secular concepts of copyright 
and trade secret law, it has become clear that a much broader 
motivation prevailed—the stifling of criticism and dissent of the 
religious practices of Scientology . . . .10 
Even during oral arguments, RTC’s counsel made arguments that 
seemed of little or no relevance to the substantive trade secret claims, 
but were more about objecting to criticisms of Scientology.11 
 In the series of cases constituting the Religious Technology Center v. 
Scott litigation, the church also proceeded with aggressive litigation tac-
tics.12 The pretrial litigation continued for an astounding nine years and 
                                                                                                                      
4 RTC’s trade secret claims were often accompanied by copyright claims as well. See, e.g., 
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma (Lerma IV ), 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1569, 1572 (E.D. Va. 1996); 
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs. (Netcom II), 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1239 
(N.D. Cal. 1995). 
5 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma (Lerma III ), 908 F. Supp. 1353, 1360 (E.D. Va. 1995). 
6 Id. 
7 See id. 
8 Id. at 1355, 1361–62. 
9 See id. at 1361. 
10 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma (Lerma II ), 908 F. Supp. 1362, 1368 (E.D. Va. 1995). 
11 See Lerma III, 908 F. Supp. at 1360. 
12 See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Scott, Nos. 94-55781, 94-55920, 1996 WL 171443, at *1 (9th 
Cir. 1996). 
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involved “three discovery magistrates, a special master, the recusal of two 
district court judges, the denial of five petitions for writ of mandamus, 
three appeals, . . . and three denials of certiorari by the Supreme Court 
. . . .”13 Final judgment was eventually entered by the third district judge 
to sit on the case.14 The court not only found Scientology’s conduct rep-
rehensible enough to dismiss its claim, but it also found that its conduct 
warranted granting one of the defendants $2.9 million in attorney’s 
fees.15 Part V of this Article will revisit these cases and explain how they 
fit with the main arguments leading to my conclusion.16 
B. This Article’s Approach 
 Although the Scientology cases serve as an interesting illustration 
of the problem, any solution requires a more nuanced examination of 
the interrelated factors at play in trade secret litigation. Accordingly, 
Part I explains the nature of trade secret cases and the contexts within 
which they commonly arise.17 In addition, Part I provides a primer on 
the fundamental nature of trade secret law and discusses the property 
and commercial privacy interests that often frame these cases.18 Part II 
analyzes the relevant First Amendment issues associated with trade se-
cret litigation, including not only defendants’ right to free speech but 
also plaintiff trade secret owners’ right to petition the government for 
redress of grievances.19 Part III demonstrates that misuse of litigation is 
not unique to trade secret law, and that the other areas of intellectual 
property litigation (patent law, trademark law, and copyright law) suffer 
from the same concerns.20 
 In Part IV, the Article argues that existing litigation safeguards in 
trade secret cases offer further measures that serve to minimize First 
Amendment harms.21 The challenge is to apply these standards with 
sufficient rigor to achieve the optimal balance between plaintiff trade 
secret holders’ rights and defendants’ free speech rights, thus reducing 
possible misuse. The Article also suggests that other pre-litigation con-
siderations, such as the costs of seeking injunctions and the risks of ex-
                                                                                                                      
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 See id. at *5. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the award. Id. at *7. 
16 See infra notes 146–157 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 24–38 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 39–59 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 60–83 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 84–118 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 119–135 and accompanying text. 
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posing trade secrets in the litigation process, serve as a check on possi-
ble overuse of trade secret claims for illegitimate purposes.22 
 After setting forth the arguments why existing procedural, substan-
tive, and practical considerations appear adequate to curb free speech 
incursions, Part V applies the arguments to the most problematic sce-
nario, the Scientology cases.23 Finally, the Article concludes that be-
cause these free speech concerns are not more troublesome in, or 
unique to, trade secret litigation, and existing safeguards can minimize 
the problem, restrictions on trade secret misappropriation suits would 
not be advisable. 
I. Understanding Trade Secret Lawsuits 
 The majority of trade secret cases are not factually similar to the 
Scientology cases because they are born out of business relationships 
between the parties, arising mostly in the employment context. Courts 
have consistently recognized an employer’s right to protect and pre-
serve trade secrets, as well as confidential and proprietary informa-
tion.24 An employer has a recognized business interest in protecting 
trade secrets disclosed in confidence to an employee during the course 
of her employment even where there is no enforceable restrictive cove-
nant between the parties.25 As one court notes, however, “[the] protec-
tion given to trade secrets is a shield . . . for the preservation of trust in 
confidential relationships; it is not a sword to be used by employers to 
retain employees by the threat of rendering them substantially unem-
ployable . . . .”26 Accordingly, careful consideration must be given to 
protecting trade secrets in a way that does not unreasonably impinge 
on employees’ and other users’ rights. 
 In addition to the employer-employee cases, many trade secret 
cases involve actions between competitors. One of the goals of trade 
secret law is “[t]he maintenance of standards of commercial ethics.”27 
Thus, while competition is a valued part of doing business, trade secret 
laws establish boundaries to ensure that this competition is not done 
unfairly. Just as it would not be fair for a company to break into its 
competitor’s locked safe to steal its secret formula, so it is unfair to mis-
                                                                                                                      
22 See infra notes 136–145 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 146–157 and accompanying text. 
24 See, e.g., New England Canteen Serv., Inc. v. Ashley, 363 N.E.2d 526, 528 (Mass. 
1977); Steens & Co. v. Stiles, 71 A. 802, 805–06 (R.I. 1909). 
25 See, e.g., Steens, 71 A. at 805–06. 
26 E.W. Bliss Co. v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., 408 F.2d 1108, 1112–13 (8th Cir. 1969). 
27 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974). 
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appropriate a competitor’s trade secrets by hiring a former employee 
who will disclose those secrets. Accordingly, courts must strike the ap-
propriate balance between anti-competitive conduct and trade secret 
protection in deciding trade secret cases. 
A. Illustrative “Problematic” Cases 
 The kinds of trade secret cases that draw criticism appear to fall 
into two main categories. I label those “sword” cases and “shield” cases: 
Sword cases involve preventing others from divulging or using alleged 
trade secrets. Shield cases include claims made to protect trade secrets 
from revelation to a third party or to the public.28 This paper will focus 
on the sword cases, because those are the cases more likely to raise free 
speech concerns. 
 The application of trade secret law as a silencing sword has been 
varied. Sometimes the silencing is direct, like applying a muzzle. In the 
2001 Kansas Court of Appeals case, Farmer’s Group, Inc. v. Lee, for exam-
ple, an employer tried to prohibit a former employee from assisting 
prosecution of claims against the employer, arguing that the testimony 
related to the employer’s trade secrets.29 Similarly, in the 1994 U.S. Su-
preme Court case CBS, Inc. v. Davis, a meat-packing company sued CBS 
to prevent its telecast of videotape footage taken at the company’s fac-
tory, alleging a violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.30 
 At other times, the silencing is more indirect, as when companies 
try to protect reputational or business interests. In the 2001 New Jersey 
Superior Court case Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, Dentrite In-
ternational sought to compel disclosure of the identities of anonymous 
Internet users on various grounds, including defamation and trade se-
cret misappropriation.31 Dendrite claimed the users posted false mes-
sages on Yahoo! message boards about management, accounting prac-
tices, and efforts to sell the company.32 There is also the more common 
scenario where employers sue former employees who leave to start a 
competing business or join a competitor. In the 2001 California Supe-
rior Court case, Paperloop.com, Inc. v. GOW, the plaintiff filed a trade se-
cret misappropriation claim against former employees who started a 
                                                                                                                      
28 In a forthcoming paper, I will analyze the shield cases and explore what might be 
appropriate legal rules and standards to govern compelled disclosures of trade secrets. 
29 28 P.3d 413, 416 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001). The court rejected the argument. Id. at 420. 
30 510 U.S. 1315, 1316 (1994). The court rejected the argument. Id. at 1318. 
31 775 A.2d 756, 759–60 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). The case was decided primar-
ily on the defamation claims. See id. at 760–61. 
32 Id. at 762–63. 
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competing website, but the employees filed a motion to strike, arguing 
that the real purpose of the employer’s lawsuit was not to protect trade 
secrets but to “silence its competition.”33 
 Many actions involve lawsuits over the alleged posting of trade se-
crets on the Internet.34 One well-known example is the 2003 California 
Supreme Court case, DVD Copy Control Ass’n, Inc. v. Bunner, where a li-
censor sued under a trade secret misappropriation theory to enjoin a 
website operator from posting, disclosing, or distributing decryption 
code on a website.35 These cases often reach beyond the familiar for-
mer-employee-as-defendant scenario, and are brought against third 
parties who do not necessarily have a relationship with the plaintiff 
trade secret owner. In Bunner the defendant was a website operator.36 
Similarly, in the 1999 Eastern District of Michigan case, Ford Motor Co. v. 
Lane, the defendant was an individual who operated a website about 
Ford Motor Company, and Ford contended that he published sensitive 
photographs and other materials allegedly constituting trade secret in-
formation.37 Finally, the Scientology cases include many instances of 
the church suing to remove criticisms published on the Internet.38 
B. Understanding the Nature of Trade Secret Rights 
 The fundamental nature of trade secret rights, in particular the 
underlying proprietary and corporate privacy interests, has implications 
for how courts and plaintiff trade secret holders view, interpret, and 
approach these cases. Ultimately these interests also help illustrate why 
free speech issues do not pose an overriding concern sufficient to jus-
tify restrictions on trade secret litigation. Before delving more fully into 
                                                                                                                      
33 Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Journalism Sources as Trade Secrets: Whose Source Is It 
Anyway?, 23 Whittier L. Rev. 985, 993 (2002) (internal quotations omitted) (discussing 
Paperloop.com, Inc. v. Gow, No. 322044, 2001 WL 1674804 (Cal. Super. Ct., Sept. 14, 
2001)). The court denied the motion to strike, finding that the plaintiff demonstrated a 
sufficient probability of success. Paperloop.com, 2001 WL 1674804, at *3. 
34 The fact that many of these disclosures involve publication on the Internet is note-
worthy, and I have addressed the implications and challenges arising from trade secrets on 
the Internet in separate papers. See generally Elizabeth A. Rowe, Introducing a Takedown for 
Trade Secrets on the Internet, 2007 Wisc. L. Rev. 1041 [hereinafter Introducing a Takedown]; 
Elizabeth A. Rowe, Saving Trade Secret Disclosures on the Internet Through Sequential Preserva-
tion, 42 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1 (2007). 
35 75 P.3d 1, 7–8 (Cal. 2003). 
36 Id. at 6. 
37 67 F. Supp. 2d 745, 747 (E.D. Mich. 1999). 
38 See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs. (Netcom II ), 923 F. 
Supp. 1231, 1238–39 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
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that discussion, this subpart will review some relevant basics about trade 
secret law. 
 Trade secret law provides protection for facts, ideas, inventions, 
and information. A trade secret can be any information of value used 
in business that has been kept secret and provides an economic advan-
tage over competitors.39 Because companies invest millions of dollars in 
research, development, and other aspects of their businesses that pro-
vide their competitive edge, trade secret protection serves as an incen-
tive to invest the resources to create trade secrets, and to share those 
secrets with employees.40 
 Trade secret protection is attractive relative to other kinds of intel-
lectual property protection in part because of the broad scope of in-
formation that is protectable and the relative ease with which a business 
can claim such protection.41 A business can, for example, protect trade 
secrets without complying with a government registration system.42 Se-
curing trade secret information is the most critical task for any putative 
trade secret holder because once a trade secret has been disclosed, 
even inadvertently, it ceases to be a trade secret.43 
 The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”) codifies the basic prin-
ciples of common law trade secret protection.44 It has been adopted in 
                                                                                                                      
39 See Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005); Re-
statement (First) of Torts § 757 cmt. b (1939). 
40 See Jerry Cohen & Alan S. Gutterman, Trade Secrets Protection and Exploi-
tation 12–13 (1998); see also Paul Goldstein, Copyright, Patent, Trademark and 
Related State Doctrines: Cases and Materials on the Law of Intellectual Prop-
erty 114–72 (4th ed. 1997). 
41 See Brooks W. Taylor, Comment, You Can’t Say That!: Enjoining Publication of Trade Se-
crets Despite the First Amendment, 9 Comp. L. Rev. & Tech. J. 393, 394–95 (2005) (discussing 
reasons why corporations rely on trade secret protection). 
42 See id. at 394. Copyright protection may also attach without registration, but registra-
tion is necessary before a plaintiff files suit for infringement. Thus, prior to registration, a 
copyright owner is in a similar situation as a trade secret owner who does not know 
whether the targeted material will indeed be protectable. Registration of a copyright pro-
vides a presumption of validity. See Bibbero Sys., Inc. v. Colwell Sys., Inc., 893 F.2d 1104, 
1106 (9th Cir. 1990). 
43 While the risk of loss is one that is inherent in choosing this form of protection, it 
does not necessarily suggest that a trade secret owner should have instead chosen patent 
protection. Patent protection is not necessarily “better” than trade secret protection, espe-
cially since there is a wide range of information eligible for trade secret protection that is 
not eligible for patent protection. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent 
Protection and Trade Secret Protection: A Legal and Business Decision, 84 J. Pat. & Trademark 
Off. Soc’y 371. 377–80 (2002); see also James Pooley, Trade Secrets § 3.01(1)(a) (Law 
Journal Press 2008) (1997). 
44 See Unif. Trade Secrets Act (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005). 
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whole or part by forty-five states and the District of Columbia.45 The 
states that have not adopted the UTSA usually follow the Restatement of 
Tort’s codification of trade secret law. Because the UTSA is the govern-
ing framework in the vast majority of states, and because there are no 
critical differences between the UTSA and non-UTSA states for the 
purposes of this paper, it will serve as the substantive legal framework 
where applicable. 
1. Proprietary Interests 
 Trade secret rights derive, in part, from property interests.46 The 
Supreme Court, for example, has found that the interest in a trade se-
cret can be protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.47 This 
property-based pedigree of trade secret law carries legal implications 
that affect both the way courts approach trade secrets as well as how 
trade secret owners view their trade secrets. 
 One relevant implication is that courts tend to lend greater weight 
to interests that can be characterized as a property right when balanc-
ing these rights against First Amendment concerns.48 While this does 
not mean that trade secrets should be categorically immune from First 
Amendment scrutiny, the converse is also true.49 Rather, in each case it 
is important to consider such factors as the strength and context of the 
trade secret claim, the nature of the speech restriction, and the public 
interests favoring disclosure.50 
                                                                                                                      
45 See Uniform Law Commissioners, Uniform Trade Secrets Act, http://www.nccusl.org/ 
Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-utsa.asp (last visited Nov. 5, 2009). As of the 
writing of this paper, five states had not adopted the Act: Massachusetts, New Jersey, New 
York, Texas, and North Carolina. Id. The Act was pending before legislatures in Massachu-
setts, New Jersey and New York. Id. 
46 See Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 
Stan. L. Rev. 311, 324–26 (2008). Although trade secret law also protects against breaches 
of confidentiality, in order to succeed on a misappropriation claim, a trade secret owner 
must prove that the information rises to protectable status as a trade secret. The breach 
alone, without the property-like protectable status, is insufficient. 
47 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003–04 (1984). 
48 See, e.g., Bunner, 75 P.3d at 14 (“[P]rohibiting the disclosure of trade secrets ac-
quired by improper means is the only way to preserve the property interest created by 
trade secret law.”). 
49 See Pamela Samuelson, Principles for Resolving Conflicts Between Trade Secrets and the First 
Amendment, 58 Hastings L.J. 777, 808–11 (2007). 
50 See id. at 811–23; see also Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech 
and Civil Liability, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 1650, 1655 (2009) (proposing that application of 
the First Amendment in civil cases should depend on the nature of the government power 
involved). 
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 Another relevant implication is that holders of trade secrets gener-
ally regard them as property. Accordingly, trade secret holders may pur-
sue alleged misappropriators in much the same way that one would 
pursue a trespasser or a thief.51 In so doing, they are supported by trade 
secret misappropriation doctrines that are historically grounded in 
theories of contract and tort. 
 These proprietary considerations drive many trade secret actions 
between employers and former employees. They also support reframing 
how we conceptualize the balancing of rights between trade secret own-
ers and the users of alleged secrets. Namely, it is the defendant’s use of 
the secret (i.e., someone else’s property) that requires powerful justifica-
tion rather than the plaintiff’s use of litigation to vindicate its rights. 
Thus, just as we would not unduly restrict a business’s ability to pursue 
claims against one who embezzles money from the company, we should 
be reluctant to impose similar restrictions on trade secret holders. 
2. “Commercial Privacy” Interests 
 Trade secret rights are further supported by the public policy in-
terest in protecting commercial privacy especially in the arena of cor-
porate espionage. In the 1970 case, E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Chris-
topher before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the 
plaintiff sued for trade secret misappropriation after photographers 
were hired to take aerial photographs of a DuPont plant.52 As part of its 
holding that the photography constituted an improper means of ob-
taining another’s trade secret, the Fifth Circuit noted, without further 
explanation, that “[c]ommercial privacy must be protected from espio-
nage which could not have been reasonably anticipated or pre-
vented.”53 Four years later, the Supreme Court, in the seminal case ad-
dressing whether trade secret law is preempted by the patent law, 
seemingly adopted commercial privacy as an important policy justifica-
tion for trade secret law.54 In 1974’s Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., the 
Court reasoned that “[a] most fundamental human right, that of pri-
vacy, is threatened when industrial espionage is condoned or is made 
profitable; the state interest in denying profit to such illegal ventures is 
                                                                                                                      
51 See Lemley, supra note 46, at 319. Trade secret holders may also seek remedies under 
contract or tort-based theories. Id. 
52 431 F.2d 1012, 1013 (5th Cir. 1970). 
53 Id. at 1015–16. 
54 See Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 474, 487. 
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unchallengeable.”55 According to the Court, “the basic decency of soci-
ety” is threatened when companies steal from one another.56 
 Although these two early cases appear to have laid the foundation 
for commercial privacy in trade secret jurisprudence, the concept has 
remained undefined. None of the subsequent cases, nor any scholars 
who discuss commercial privacy, have explored its meaning in any de-
tail. The contextual application in the Christopher case suggests that 
commercial privacy may be something more than its individual privacy 
counterpart.57 In general, trade secret laws appear to provide greater 
protection to corporations against surveillance by competitors than in-
dividuals receive under privacy torts for incursions by other individu-
als.58 In addition, corporations’ privacy interests under trade secret law 
are interpreted more broadly than under the Fourth Amendment.59 
Nevertheless, for the purposes of this paper, a company’s interests in 
“commercial privacy” provides further justification for pursuing misap-
propriation actions against those suspected of committing espionage. 
II. Relevant First Amendment Issues 
 As a procedural matter, the mere filing of trade secret misappro-
priation actions (even with weak claims) should not implicate the First 
Amendment. Until a court has issued an injunction or other restraint, 
the First Amendment rights of defendants have not been implicated. 
Therefore, if the debate focuses on the filing of trade secret actions, it 
is difficult to make a credible argument that the First Amendment lim-
its the right to pursue redress for trade secret violations. 
                                                                                                                      
55 Id. at 487. 
56 Id. 
57 See Christopher, 431 F.2d at 1016. Individual privacy itself, however, remains difficult to 
conceptualize and apply. See generally Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 477 (2006) (providing a framework for the legal system’s understanding of privacy). 
58 Compare Christopher, 431 F.2d at 1015–16 (citing commercial privacy concerns while 
finding that aerial photography of unfinished plant by competitor constituted improper 
trade secret misappropriation), with Furman v. Sheppard, 744 A.2d 583, 586 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 2000) (finding that the defendant was not liable under intrusion of privacy tort for 
trespassing into a private club to engage in video surveillance of the plaintiff). 
59 Compare Christopher, 431 F.2d at 1015 (finding that aerial photography of unfinished 
plant by competitor constituted improper trade secret misappropriation), with Dow Chem. 
Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (finding that aerial photography of plant 
taken by government was not a search under the Fourth Amendment). Although some 
scholars have made analogies between Fourth Amendment privacy interests and the se-
crecy requirement of trade secret law, the meaning and significance of this notion of 
commercial privacy remains unexplored. 
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 Further, the California Supreme Court has noted that an injunc-
tion against disclosure of information that qualifies as a trade secret 
does not violate the First Amendment.60 Whether information qualifies 
as a trade secret, admittedly, is not determined until the matter is liti-
gated, well after the complaint has been filed. Thus, the initiation and 
pursuit of an action to preserve a possible trade secret, which would 
lose both its value and protected status once disclosed, would also seem 
permissible in the First Amendment sphere. 
 Nevertheless, recognizing that questions often arise about substan-
tive issues or potential conflicts between trade secret law and the First 
Amendment, this Article briefly discusses aspects relevant to its argu-
ment. It is beyond the scope of this Article, however, to enter the larger 
discussion on the role of the First Amendment in trade secret law.61 
Suffice it to say that my position is that the First Amendment should 
only have a very limited role in trade secret litigation and my reasons 
are summarized below.62 
A. Free Speech vs. Commercial Secrets 
 Trade secret misappropriation cases often involve breaches of con-
tracts or breaches of confidence. In general, when a person disclosing 
information is under a duty or is bound by an agreement not to disclose 
that information, courts are likely to address the incident solely as a 
breach of confidence or a contractual issue not presenting First Amend-
ment concerns.63 Thus, one would expect that when an employee or 
former employee reveals her employer’s trade secrets (the scenario in 
                                                                                                                      
60 DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 19–20 (Cal. 2003) (upholding a pre-
liminary injunction on the assumption that the injunction was properly issued and that 
plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits). 
61 See generally Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Prior Restraints and Intellectual Property: The Clash 
Between Intellectual Property and the First Amendment from an Economic Perspective, 12 Fordham 
Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 1, 57–67 (2001); David Greene, Trade Secrets, the First 
Amendment, and the Challenges of the Internet Age, 23 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 537 (2001); 
Adam W. Johnson, Injunctive Relief in the Internet Age: The Battle Between Free Speech and Trade 
Secrets, 54 Fed. Comm. L.J. 517 (2002); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech 
and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 Duke L.J. 147, 229–32 (1998); Samuelson, supra 
note 49; Franklin B. Goldberg, Recent Development, Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 16 Berkeley 
Tech. L.J. 271 (2001). 
62 See supra notes 63–83 and accompanying text. 
63 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 665 (1991); Snepp v. United States, 
444 U.S. 507, 510–13 (1980); Am. Motors Corp. v. Huffstutler, 575 N.E.2d 116, 120 (Ohio 
1991). 
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most trade secret cases) the First Amendment would not sanction her 
conduct.64 
 Where the alleged misappropriator was not bound by any such ob-
ligation, however, the potential for running afoul of the First Amend-
ment is greater.65 Thus, as to company outsiders who are not bound by 
any duty of confidentiality, First Amendment concerns may be impli-
cated.66 In such cases, the proprietary nature of trade secret rights67 re-
quires both a thoughtful analysis under the First Amendment and the 
same kind of deference granted to other types of intellectual property. 
This is not to suggest that treating trade secrets as property makes them 
immune to First Amendment concerns, but rather that a lower level of 
scrutiny might be appropriate.68 
 One additional factor should be noted.69 The speech at issue in 
many trade secret misappropriation cases is not speech that is fully pro-
tected by the First Amendment. Trade secret cases involve a significant 
                                                                                                                      
64 See Samuelson, supra note 49, at 780–82 (discussing why the First Amendment is of-
ten not applicable in trade secret cases); Solove & Richards, supra note 50, at 1690–94 
(proposing that application of the First Amendment in civil cases should depend on the 
nature of the government power involved). 
65 See Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D. Mich. 1999). In the 1991 case 
Ford Motor Co. v. Lane before the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 
the defendant, Lane, operated a website with news about Ford and its products. Id. at 747. 
Lane received confidential Ford documents from an anonymous source, and initially 
agreed not to disclose most of the information. Id. Lane eventually published some docu-
ments on his website relating to the quality of Ford’s products despite knowing that the 
documents were confidential. Id. at 747–48. Ford sought a restraining order to prevent 
publication of the documents, claiming the documents were trade secrets. Id. at 748. The 
court acknowledged that Ford could show Lane had misappropriated its trade secrets, but 
reversed the order on First Amendment grounds, considering an injunction to prevent 
Lane from publishing trade secrets a prior restraint. Id. at 753. 
66 The First Amendment, however, does not protect one who tries to convert a trade secret 
for economic gain. See United States v. Genovese, 409 F. Supp. 2d 253, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
67 See, e.g. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1000–04 (1984) (trade secrets are 
property interests protected by the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause); Chicago Lock Co. v. 
Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400, 404 (9th Cir. 1982) (trade secrets are protected from improper tak-
ings like private property); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904, 912 
(Ct. Cl. 1961) (sale of trade secret invokes capital gains tax); Teller v. Teller, 53 P.3d 240, 247–
49 (Haw. 2002) (trade secrets are property for division in marital estate); Peabody v. Norfolk, 
98 Mass. 452, 458 (Mass. 1868) (endorsing business secrets as property interests); Den-Tal-Ez, 
Inc. v. Siemens Capital Corp., 566 A.2d 1214, 1228 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (endorsing trade 
secrets as property); see also Bunner, 75 P.3d at 11–16 (endorsing the property rights view of 
trade secret law). 
68 See Solove & Richards, supra note 50, at 1692–94. 
69 This paragraph is adapted from my earlier work, Rowe, Introducing a Takedown, supra 
note 34, at 1077–78. 
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amount of commercial speech.70 Although commercial speech is af-
forded some First Amendment protection, it is lesser protection than 
that given to other kinds of speech, such as political speech.71 There-
fore, any assessment of First Amendment conflicts that arise under trade 
secret law must account for this weaker level of protection.72 Ultimately, 
in practical terms the goal of trade secret law is to strike the proper bal-
ance between restricting disclosures to protect legitimate trade secrets 
while permitting disclosures that are more readily recognized as being 
in the public interest.73 Free speech concerns should not automatically 
outweigh the other significant interests recognized by trade secret law. 
B. The First Amendment Right to Petition 
 When considering restrictions on plaintiff trade secret owners’ 
rights to file misappropriation actions, an often overlooked First Amend-
ment right is the plaintiff’s right to petition the government for redress 
of grievances. This right is protected in the Petition Clause of the First 
                                                                                                                      
70 The U.S. Supreme Court has defined commercial speech as “speech which does no 
more than propose a commercial transaction.” Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 
60, 66 (1983) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Speech may be treated as com-
mercial speech even if it both proposes a commercial transaction and addresses social or 
political issues. See id. at 66–68. Merely because speech concerns a commercial subject, how-
ever, does not necessarily make it commercial speech for First Amendment purposes. See City 
of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 421 (1993). The speech must be 
evaluated as a whole, including consideration of the purpose of the speech. See Margreth 
Barrett, Domain Names, Trademarks and the First Amendment: Searching for Meaningful Boundaries, 
39 Conn. L. Rev. 973, 988 (2007) (discussing commercial and non-commercial speech in 
trademark law). For more on the difficulties of defining commercial speech, see Alex Kozin-
ski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 Va. L. Rev. 627, 638–48 (1990), and 
David F. McGowan, Comment, A Critical Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 359, 
381–410 (1990). 
71 See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 
557, 562–63 (1980); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 770–72 & n.24 (1976). 
72 Indeed, defendants sometimes seek to dismiss trade secret actions alleging that such 
complaints violate state anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuits against public participation) statutes that 
prohibit the filing of suits against those who exercise their right to free speech in connection 
with a public issue. In trade secret disputes between competitors, however, or in disuptes in-
volving former employees, this argument is likely to be unsuccessful. See, e.g., World Fin. 
Group, Inc. v. HBW Ins. & Fin. Servs., 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d 227, 233–38 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
73 For instance, one may be privileged to disclose trade secret information “that is rele-
vant to public health or safety, or to the commission of a crime or tort, or to other matters of 
substantial public concern.” Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 40 cmt. c 
(1995). Some whistleblowing statutes also privilege disclosures of information that potentially 
include trade secrets. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (2006); N.Y. Lab. Law § 740(2) (McKin-
ney 2002 & Supp. 2009). 
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Amendment.74 It has been described as a “fundamental right,”75 and 
“among the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of 
Rights.”76 While it is not an absolute right that confers immunity on a 
plaintiff who files an action,77 it is an important constitutional considera-
tion among the other First Amendment protections. 
 Recognizing this essential interest in the right to petition for re-
dress of grievances, the U.S. Supreme Court has established a two part 
test in the antitrust context for determining when the filing of an ac-
tion constitutes “sham” litigation.78 First, the lawsuit must be “objec-
tively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically 
expect success on the merits” and second, the subjective motivation “to 
interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor” must 
be present.79 In this two step process, one arrives at the subjective de-
termination of the litigant’s anti-competitive motivation only after the 
objective component has been met.80 
 Notably, this interest in protecting the right to petition for redress 
of grievances is already reflected in existing trade secret law. The sham 
litigation approach from the antitrust cases is consistent with the gen-
eral approach courts have taken in deciding whether trade secret plain-
tiffs have filed actions in bad faith.81 In the 2002 U.S. District Court for 
the District of Maryland case Contract Materials Processing, Inc. v. Kataleuna 
GmbH Catalysts, for example, a technology company sought millions of 
dollars in damages against defendants on claims including trade secret 
misappropriation.82 The court found the claims were brought in bad 
faith and awarded defendants their attorney’s fees in part because the 
plaintiff failed to keep the alleged trade secret confidential.83 This “bad 
faith” approach respects a trade secret owner’s right to “petition” by 
filing an action when it believes its trade secret has been misappropri-
ated, while also ameliorating free speech concerns by deterring the 
                                                                                                                      
74 U.S. Const. amend. I. 
75 United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971). 
76 United Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967). 
77 See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482–85 (1985). 
78 Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60–61 
(1993). 
79 Id. (internal emphasis and citations omitted). 
80 Id. at 60. 
81 See infra notes 127–134 and accompanying text. 
82 See 222 F. Supp. 2d 733, 734 (D. Md. 2002). 
83 Id. at 737–38; see also Streamline Packaging, Inc. v. Vinton Packaging Group, Inc., 
No. 1:06-CV-701, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74451, at *7 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 3, 2007) (granting 
defendant attorney’s fees after finding complete lack of objective evidence to support 
trade secret claim filed by plaintiff). 
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plaintiff from filing a baseless action because it knows that it may be 
liable for the defendant’s attorney’s fees. 
III. Misuse of Litigation Not Unique to Trade Secret Cases 
 In assessing the concern that trade secret litigation encroaches on 
free speech rights, it is important to underscore that these issues are not 
unique to trade secret law, but are part of a larger problem of civil litiga-
tion misuse. When it comes to protecting commercially valuable infor-
mation, patent litigation, trademark litigation, and copyright litigation 
are at least as problematic as trade secret litigation—particularly in the 
digital age. Each area of law has cases of questionable merit that cost 
defendants thousands or millions of dollars, and that ultimately leave 
observers with a troubling sense of uneasiness about the underlying sub-
stantive law and the propriety these actions. Yet these cases present the 
same concerns as can be found in the larger body of civil litigation, in-
cluding defamation, medical malpractice, and contract disputes.84 
Overall, these problems are side effects of existing civil litigation rules 
and any meaningful reform must be considered in that context. Al-
though on the surface a quick fix might appear to be adoption of the 
English rule, where losing parties pay prevailing parties’ attorney’s fees, 
the problem requires a more nuanced solution for the reasons outlined 
below.85 
 In intellectual property cases, it is often difficult for a plaintiff to 
determine the strength of his or her case at the inception of litigation. 
The standards for infringement and misappropriation are not blessed 
with razor sharp precision, but instead are highly fact-dependant. The 
subjectivity of a judge or jury further adds to the uncertainty. Thus, in 
trade secret litigation, a putative trade secret holder may not know with 
any certainty whether a court will agree that the information is indeed a 
trade secret, or whether the court will find that the holder has made 
“reasonable efforts” to protect the trade secret.86 Similarly, in patent law, 
                                                                                                                      
84 See, e.g., Maxwell J. Mehlman, The Shame of Medical Malpractice, 27 J. Legal Med. 17, 
18 (2006) (“[N]on-meritorious malpractice claims are asserted, and a significant number 
of these claims are successful.”); Robert J. Rhee, A Principled Solution for Negligent Infliction of 
Emotional Distress Claims, 36 Ariz. St. L.J. 805, 835 (2004) (“Frivolous, fraudulent, and abu-
sive claims are brought everyday across the wide spectrum of law for settlement value or 
other inappropriate reasons.”). 
85 See Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93 Iowa L. Rev. 1271, 
1304–05 (2008) (discussing the English and American fee-shifting rules in the context of 
copyright reform). 
86 See Elizabeth A. Rowe, Contributory Negligence, Technology, and Trade Secrets 14 (Univ. of Fla. 
Levin College of Law Research Paper No. 2008-06, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
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judges often differ on the interpretation of patent claims; in trademark 
law, the likelihood of confusion standard calls for consideration of about 
nine fact-intensive factors; and in copyright law, the fair use defense is a 
flexible rule-of-reason defense that can be applied in different ways by 
different courts.87 
 This uncertainty puts most defendants, especially those defending 
against frivolous claims, in an almost no-win situation. Ambiguous stan-
dards and complex factual issues make it difficult to prevail on sum-
mary judgment. Even when defendants ultimately prevail on the merits 
at trial, it comes after out-of-pocket costs of thousands or millions of 
dollars.88 Accordingly, defendants often feel pressed into settlement.89 
 Thus, the sentiment that “something must be done” to restrain 
runaway plaintiffs is understandable. But whether the articulated con-
cern is free speech or otherwise, and whether the field is trade secret 
law or any other civil area, it is important to recognize the larger inter-
connected complexities involved, and resist the temptation to “fix” iso-
lated pieces such as changing the substantive law, or restricting plain-
tiffs’ rights to file actions.90 Although isolated and reactive approaches 
may serve as short term band-aids, they do not address any larger un-
derlying structural issues effectively. It is also worth remembering the 
basic principle that no system is perfect or without disadvantages. Ac-
cordingly, it may be that these issues are simply side effects of our civil 
process, and do not necessarily mean that the system overall is broken. 
Though critics may always be able to identify perceived “problems,” 
without careful examination of data, it is very difficult to ascertain the 
true magnitude and significance of areas in need of fixing and hence 
the most effective approaches to doing so.91 
                                                                                                                      
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1161166 (discussing the inconsistent approaches and outcomes 
that courts use to analyze the reasonable efforts requirement). 
87 See Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property 
Litigation, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 509, 513 (2003). 
88 See id. at 513–14. 
89 See id. at 515. 
90 See Cotter, supra note 85, at 1275 (recognizing the shortcomings of individual re-
form proposals and the need to include more fundamental measures in the context of 
perceived copyright overenforcement). 
91 See, e.g., Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Justice Scalia’s “Renegade Jurisdiction”: Lessons for Patent 
Law Reform, 83 Tul. L. Rev. 111, 114 (2008) (demonstrating that criticism of plaintiffs’ 
venue choices in patent litigation did not bear out upon empirical study of the cases). 
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A. Patent Litigation 
 Recent trends in patent litigation have been much criticized and 
there is a move to reform patent law, in part because of the view that 
patent owners file frivolous suits or use patent litigation to extract set-
tlements from parties who cannot afford costly patent litigation.92 Some 
even characterize patent plaintiffs as legal extortionists.93 One case that 
captured the attention of the national media and business world was 
the 2005 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
in NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd.94 NTP filed suit against the defen-
dant, maker of the Blackberry® device, claiming that the device in-
fringed several of its patents.95 Although the trial resulted in $53.7 mil-
lion in damages and the issuance of a permanent injunction against the 
defendant,96 the damage award and the injunction were ultimately va-
cated on appeal, although the judgment of infringement on some of 
the claims was upheld.97 Thus, as is not entirely unusual with complex 
civil cases, this multi-year litigation left the appeals court with mixed 
results for both parties and was remanded back to the district court. 
 The interesting and ironic twist on the story, however, is that the 
defendant ended up paying more to the plaintiff than the original trial 
court judgment, even though the patents-in-suit were of questionable 
validity. Indeed, on subsequent reexamination of the patents in 2006, 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) rejected all 
five of the patents involved in the case.98 Nevertheless, Research in Mo-
tion ultimately settled with NTP for $612.5 million.99 Moreover, while 
appeal of the USPTO’s rejection of the patents is pending, NTP has 
continued to file patent infringement suits against other major U.S. 
carriers who offer mobile e-mail services such as Verizon Wireless, 
                                                                                                                      
92 See, e.g., id. at 118–19 (noting critics’ views that “patent litigation is out of control” 
and that plaintiffs “aggressively bring baseless patent infringement cases”). 
93 Daniel J. McFeely, Comment, An Argument for Restricting the Patent Rights of Those Who 
Misuse the U.S. Patent System to Earn Money Through Litigation, 40 Ariz. St. L. J. 289, 289–90 
(2008) (arguing that patent “trolls” use patent litigation as “legalized extortion”). 
94 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
95 Id. at 1290. 
96 Id. at 1291–92. 
97 Id. at 1325–26. 
98 See Colin Gibbs, NTP Sets Its Sights on Carriers: Patent Holder Files Suit Against Big 4, 
RCR Wireless News, Sept. 15, 2007, at 3, available at http://www.rcrwireless.com/article/ 
20070915/SUB/70914021/NTP-sets-its-sight-on-carriers. 
99 See McFeely, supra note 93, at 296 (“RIM’s settlement may have been partially moti-
vated by pressure from the investment community and from customers worried about 
RIM’s ability to continue to provide wireless messaging services given the uncertainty cre-
ated by the litigation.”). 
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Sprint Nextel, AT&T, and T-Mobile USA.100 One wonders whether this 
kind of plaintiff or circumstance in patent litigation is any less offensive 
than the Church of Scientology and its trade secret cases. 
B. Trademark Litigation 
 Another area of intellectual property that raises troubling free 
speech concerns for many commentators is trademark litigation.101 
These commentators generally focus on trademark doctrine and con-
tradictory interpretations by the courts that may lead to overbroad 
rights for trademark owners vis-à-vis free speech.102 More on point for 
the purposes of this Article, however, are the frequent instances where 
trademark owners use trademark litigation, or the threat of litigation, 
to pursue those who reference their trademarks as part of cultural or 
political speech, often at great costs to the defendants.103 As a result, 
trademark owners may deter speech and even control the content of 
material posted on the Internet and elsewhere, all in the name of pro-
tecting their goodwill.104 
 Similar to the Scientology cases, there are also examples of plain-
tiffs repeatedly pursuing meritless trademark infringement suits. One 
example involved S Industries, a company that claimed to own the mark 
SENTRA, which was used on discount computer mouse pads.105 It sued 
a company named Centra 2000 that used CENTRA on its customized, 
data-management software.106 After four years of litigation, in the 2001 
ruling S Industries, Inc. v. Centra 2000, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit upheld a ruling against the plaintiff and the grant of 
attorney’s fees to the defendant.107 The court found that S Industries 
                                                                                                                      
100 See Gibbs supra note 98, at 3. 
101 See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 70, at 976; Jacqueline D. Lipton, Commerce Versus Com-
mentary: Gripe Sites, Parody, and the First Amendment in Cyberspace, 84 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1327, 
1332 (2006); Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 SMU 
L. Rev. 381, 451–52 (2008). 
102 See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 101, at 1351 (discussing contradictory treatment of 
gripe sites between the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth and Fourth circuits). 
103 See Hannibal Travis, The Battle for Mindshare: The Emerging Consensus that the First 
Amendment Protects Corporate Criticism and Parody on the Internet, 10 Va. J. L. & Tech. 3, ¶ 26 
(2005) (noting that “[a] large number of rather frivolous trademark infringement claims 
have been litigated all the way up to the federal appellate courts”). 
104 See Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum, 28 
Cardozo L. Rev. 1789, 1839–40 (2007) (“[T]he threat of litigation alone . . . by a corpo-
rate giant is sufficient to dissuade a person from making fair use of a trademark.”). 
105 S Indus., Inc. v. Centra 2000, Inc., 249 F.3d 625, 627 (7th Cir. 2001). 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
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did not have a federally registered trademark in SENTRA, nor did it 
ever use the mark for any computer-related software or hardware.108 The 
company had also engaged in a pattern of abusive litigation, filing at 
least thirty-three trademark infringement lawsuits (on another mark) in 
a two-year period in one district court, and within one year had lost on 
summary judgment on all six of the cases that had been decided.109 
C. Copyright Litigation 
 Copyright litigation has also been criticized for its censorship ten-
dencies, especially when plaintiffs appear to be suing to prevent speech 
that criticizes them or their products. Whether it be the copyright 
holder of Beanie Babies allegedly seeking to enjoin negative criticism 
about its products,110 or copyright holders seeking to prevent others 
from publishing allegedly copyrighted materials on the Internet, these 
cases raise the same types of free speech and anti-competitive concerns 
that are present in trade secret and other intellectual property litiga-
tion. Indeed, the complaints often expressly include alleged violations 
of other intellectual property rights in addition to copyright claims.111 
 Another facet of copyright law that allegedly has been subject to 
abuse is the takedown provision of the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act.112 Under this provision, Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) receive 
immunity from copyright infringement claims if they remove or disable 
access to material that has been identified in a takedown notice from 
the copyright holder.113 Since 2002, the Chilling Effects web site has in-
vited the public and ISPs to submit cease-and-desist and takedown no-
tices that they have received from copyright holders.114 Studies of these 
posted takedown notices have raised some concerns about the merits of 
the underlying copyright claims in these notices.115 In particular, one 
                                                                                                                      
108 Id. 
109 See S Indus., Inc. v. Ecolab Inc., No. 96 C 4140, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3484, at * 2 
(N.D. Ill. March 12, 1999). 
110 See Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 515 (7th Cir. 2002). 
111 See, e.g., id. (involving both copyright and trademark infringement claims); Reli-
gious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Commc’n Servs. (Netcom III ), 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1366 
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (Scientology case involving copyright and trade secret claims). 
112 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)–(d) (2006). 
113 Id. 
114 DMCA Safe Harbor, http://www.chillingeffects.org/dmca512 (last visited Oct. 31, 
2009). 
115 See, e.g., Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”? 
Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 Santa Clara 
Computer & High Tech. L.J. 621, 667–78 (2006). 
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study concluded that over one-fifth of the notices either represented 
weak claims or were subject to strong fair-use or First Amendment de-
fenses.116 Despite these concerns, the majority of these takedown notices 
appear to state valid claims.117 Nevertheless, just as with trade secret liti-
gation, copyright law is also clearly subject to misuse or abuse.118 
IV. Closer Attention to Existing Litigation Safeguards 
 Even if the behavior or conduct of some trade secret plaintiffs may 
appear to impinge on defendants’ First Amendment rights, there is 
nothing about trade secret litigation in particular that justifies a broad 
brush approach to restricting those cases. As the previous discussion 
demonstrates, the problem is not unique to trade secret litigation. Fur-
thermore, there are reasons unique to the trade secret context that 
suggest we should not be overly concerned about the trade secret cases. 
 Secrecy is the key to creating and preserving a trade secret.119 This 
means that once a trade secret becomes public, it can no longer be a 
trade secret and others are free to use it. Accordingly, there are grave 
risks involved when a trade secret falls into the wrong hands. As a re-
sult, trade secret litigation, unlike other types of intellectual property 
litigation, is cloaked with a certain urgency and gravity. Moreover, there 
are procedural and substantive standards within trade secret litigation 
that, when correctly applied, serve to safeguard and balance the inter-
ests of plaintiffs and defendants and thus mitigate abuses. 
A. Preliminary Injunction Standard 
 Unlike most civil cases, the majority of trade secret misappropria-
tion cases begin in injunctive mode. Thus, in addition to filing a com-
plaint, a trade secret plaintiff will often seek a temporary restraining 
order against the defendant, and a preliminary injunction hearing will 
be set for about ten days later. This is significant because the prelimi-
                                                                                                                      
116 Marjorie Heins & Tricia Beckles, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Will Fair Use 
Survive? Free Expression in the Age of Copyright Control 32 (2005). 
117 See id. at 36. 
118 See, e.g., Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1204–05 (N.D. Cal. 
2004) (suggesting that plaintiff used the takedown provision “as a sword to suppress publica-
tion of embarrassing content rather than as a shield to protect its intellectual property”). 
119 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) (“Information that is 
public knowledge or that is generally known in an industry cannot be a trade secret.”); 
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974) (“The subject of a trade secret 
must be secret, and must not be of public knowledge or of a general knowledge in the 
trade or business.”). 
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nary injunction hearing serves as a filter that influences not only the 
procedure of the case, but also the manner in which the case is evalu-
ated by the court, thus ultimately having a large impact on the out-
come. Although the availability of preliminary injunctions could itself 
be seen as a negative tool, the mere threat of which could silence a de-
fendant or cause her to settle, the overall effect in trade secret litigation 
may instead be positive because, when properly applied, the prelimi-
nary injunction inquiry places a higher burden on the plaintiff.120 
 A plaintiff seeking the drastic remedy of a preliminary injunction 
must demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. The 
plaintiff must establish that she owns a trade secret and that the defen-
dant misappropriated it.121 This can be a major turning point in the liti-
gation because the plaintiff may not be able to demonstrate through 
discovery that she actually took the necessary precautions to earn trade 
secret protection.122 Further, the plaintiff must be able to point to an 
imminent threat of actual harm to succeed.123 The preliminary injunc-
tion process therefore serves as a stringent filter through which many 
trademark litigation cases are processed. A court that applies injunctive 
standards rigorously, including consideration of the harm to the defen-
dant if the injunction is granted, should weed out cases that were filed 
for constitutionally offensive motives relatively early in the litigation. 
                                                                                                                      
120 See Meurer, supra note 87, at 526–27 (arguing that in the context of preliminary in-
junctions, the presumption of patent validity in patent cases should be eliminated in order 
to place a higher burden on the plaintiff to show likelihood of success). There is no such 
presumption of validity in trade secret law. 
121 See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Giles, 47 F.3d 467, 469–70 (1st Cir. 1995); EarthWeb, 
Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 314–16 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
122 See, e.g., Carboline Co. v. Lebeck, 990 F. Supp. 762, 767–68 (E.D. Mo. 1997) (finding 
that employer did not take sufficient measures to guard the secrecy of its allegedly trade 
secret information). 
123 See Cont’l Group, Inc. v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 358–59 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(requiring “an imminent threat of allegedly harmful disclosure” to justify an injunction); 
see also Regan v. Vinick & Young, 862 F.2d 896, 902 (1st Cir. 1988) (“speculation or unsub-
stantiated fears of what may happen in the future cannot provide the basis for preliminary 
injunction”); Sprint Corp. v. DeAngelo, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1194 (D. Kan. 1998) (“The 
injury complained of must be of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for 
equitable relief to prevent irreparable harm.”); Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Seagate Tech., 
Inc., 941 F. Supp. 98, 101 (D. Minn. 1992) (“A trade secret will not be protected by the 
extraordinary remedy of injunction on mere suspicion or apprehension of injury.”); Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Cont’l Aviation & Eng’g Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645, 654 (E.D. Mich. 
1966) (“There must be a substantial threat of impending injury before an injunction will 
issue.”). 
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B. Substantive Legal Standard 
 Trade secret law permits a putative trade secret holder to establish 
its trade secret rights for the first time in litigation. As a threshold mat-
ter, the trade secret owner bears the burden of establishing that the in-
formation in question was entitled to trade secret protection before it 
was allegedly misappropriated.124 This substantive determination is at 
the heart of every trade secret case. As an evidentiary matter, the big-
gest challenges for most plaintiffs lie in identifying the trade secret with 
specificity, and showing reasonable efforts to preserve the secrecy of the 
alleged trade secret. 
 Just as a plaintiff in patent litigation must own the patent which it 
alleges has been infringed, a trade secret plaintiff must identify the spe-
cific information that it claims is a trade secret. This is especially impor-
tant in trade secret law because, unlike in patent law, there is no gov-
ernment registration or certification of a trade secret prior to litigation, 
nor is there a presumption of validity.125 Often, however, one reads an 
opinion in a misappropriation case and finds that the court devotes 
very little, if any, discussion to this critical issue.126 Defense counsel and 
the court should insist that the plaintiff meet its burden. Too often, the 
burden effectively shifts to the defendant to prove that the information 
is not a trade secret, either because the alleged trade secret is generally 
known or because the plaintiff did not take steps to protect it.127 A 
thorough understanding and proper application of the substantive le-
gal standards that determine whether a protectable trade secret exists 
in conjunction with the procedural hurdles of the injunctive process 
should provide a double-layered protection against frivolous cases. 
                                                                                                                      
124 The standard utilized for this inquiry should be akin to the likelihood of success on 
the merits standard used in preliminary injunction cases. Most trade secret cases, particu-
larly in the context of the problem presented here, will be decided at a preliminary injunc-
tion hearing. Thus, use of this standard should present no further difficulty and may very 
well fold into the injunction test. 
125 See Charles Tait Graves & Brian D. Range, Identification of Trade Secret Claims in Litiga-
tion: Solutions for a Ubiquitous Dispute, 5 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 68, 70–71 (2006) (dis-
cussing the importance of precise identification of alleged trade secrets and proposing 
standards to guide the process). 
126 See, e.g., Rohm & Haas Co. v. Adco Chem. Co., 689 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1982); Smith v. 
Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953); U.S. Sporting Prods., Inc. v. Johnny Stewart 
Game Calls, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993). 
127 See Tait Graves, Bad Faith and the Public Domain: Requiring a Pre-Lawsuit Investigation of 
Potential Trade Secret Claims, 8 Va. J.L. & Tech. 12, ¶ 10 (2003). 
1448 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 50:1425 
C. Bad Faith Claims 
 When a plaintiff files an action knowing, for instance, that it does 
not have a protectable trade secret, it can be subject to liability on a bad 
faith claim by the defendant. Indeed, the UTSA expressly provides that 
“[i]f . . . a claim of misappropriation is made in bad faith . . . the court 
may award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party.”128 These 
findings are generally made when plaintiffs have failed to produce suf-
ficient evidence of the existence of a trade secret, and it was apparent 
that plaintiff had this knowledge prior to initiating the lawsuit. Accord-
ingly, the claims would frequently fail any objective test of whether a 
reasonable litigant would have expected success on the merits.129 
 More specifically, this often means that the key elements necessary 
to establishing trade secret protection (i.e., demonstrating that the in-
formation is in fact secret and that the owner has taken steps to protect 
that secrecy) are missing. In the 1989 case, Stilwell Development, Inc. v. 
Chen, for example, the plaintiff presented no evidence of a trade secret 
or of misappropriation.130 The U.S. District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California held that the plaintiff had knowingly and intention-
ally brought a bad faith claim and awarded the defendant attorney’s 
fees.131 Simlarly, in the 1998 case VSL Corp. v. General Technologies, Inc., 
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California found a 
plaintiff’s claim to be objectively specious when the plaintiff had been 
careless about guarding the alleged trade secret, including distributing 
the information to others without promises of confidentiality.132 
 Thus, the bad faith provision provides a similar kind of protection 
and penalty as the misuse doctrine that exists in both patent law and 
copyright law.133 Although the misuse doctrine does not appear to be 
available in trade secret law, the principle is further reflected in claims 
against trade secret plaintiffs for antitrust violations. In the 1985 case, 
                                                                                                                      
128 Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 4 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005). 
129 See, e.g., FAS Techs. Ltd. v. Dainippon Screen Mfg., Co., No. C 00-01879 CRB, 2001 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15444, at *11–12 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2001) (finding that plaintiff’s con-
tinued assertion of misappropriation, without any showing of damage, lacked any objective 
or subjective basis and thus the claims were pursued in bad faith). 
130 See Stilwell Dev., Inc. v. Chen, No. CV86-4487-GHK, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5971, at 
*13–14 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1989). 
131 See id. at *13–14, *22; see also Degussa Admixtures, Inc. v. Burnett, 277 F. App’x 530, 
534 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding trade secret claim filed in bad faith where plaintiff had no 
direct evidence to support claim). 
132 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1356, 1360 (N.D. Cal. 1998). 
133 See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th Cir. 1990) (discussing 
copyright and patent misuse). 
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CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., for instance, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit found that a party acquiring a licensing agreement through 
the bad faith assertion of trade secrets violated antitrust laws.134 More 
courts and defendants should follow the lead of these cases and make 
use of this provision as a tool to deter unfounded trade secret claims.135 
D. Practical Pre-Litigation Considerations 
 Beyond the procedural and substantive standards that govern the 
litigation process, there are also practical considerations for plaintiffs 
that may serve as a check on possible misuse of trade secret claims. If 
trade secret holders contemplating the filing of trade secret litigation 
are rational actors, they should undertake a cost-benefit analysis that 
includes assessment of the direct and indirect costs associated with the 
initiation of an action. This risk assessment, if based on the practical re-
ality of the potential consequences of litigation as well as the procedural 
and substantive guidelines discussed above, should lead to more sound 
decisions about whether to file a suit. Ultimately, these realities, in con-
junction with oversight from courts and counsel, may constitute the 
most effective tools to stem the kinds of litigation that cause concern. 
 That being said, trade secret actions tend to be characterized by 
emotional undertones, especially where the parties had a prior relation-
ship such as in the employment context. It is not unusual for trade se-
cret plaintiffs to be motivated, at least in part, by the need to send a 
message to defendants and others that they will not tolerate what they 
perceive as betrayal or disloyalty. Where, for instance, a former em-
ployee has left to start a new competing company, a plaintiff may view 
one “benefit” of the litigation as the potential to “cause excruciating 
pain to the start-up enterprise.”136 It is therefore especially important 
                                                                                                                      
134 769 F.2d 842, 858 (1st Cir. 1985). Although cases addressing antitrust violations for 
trade secret claims are scant and are probably of use only to a narrow set of defendants, 
general allegations of anticompetitive motive are more common as part of bad-faith coun-
terclaims. See, e.g., Dentsply Int’l v. New Tech. Co., No. 96-272 MMS, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
19846, at *6 (D. Del. Dec. 19, 1996) (alleging that plaintiff filed trade secret claim in bad 
faith for purpose of hindering competition). 
135 See Graves, supra note 127, ¶¶ 3, 6 (proposing that courts find bad faith when plain-
tiffs file trade secret lawsuits without first determining that the alleged secret is not in the 
public domain). In non-UTSA jurisdictions, there may be analogous provisions under state 
law that could be used to penalize bad faith or frivolous claims. Rule 11 sanctions, for in-
stance, may be one option available in federal courts or in state courts that have adopted a 
similar rule. Note, however, that Rule 11 sanctions have not been widely applied in trade 
secret cases. See id. ¶ 33, n.39 (citing trade secret cases that have applied Rule 11). 
136 Pooley, supra note 43, § 10.01[1]. 
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that counsel for both sides identify these emotional incentives and serve 
as the voice of reason, exercising sound judgment that ethically and pro-
fessionally avoids inappropriate litigation tactics. 
 Nonetheless, the fact that most trade secret lawsuits occur between 
employers and former employees137 bears significance for the free 
speech concerns examined in this Article. It suggests that if many of the 
cases are about business and employment relationships between indi-
viduals with hurt feelings, then the information in question is not likely 
the kind of information protected by the First Amendment.138 
1. Encouraging Disclosure by Threatening to Sue 
 When a company threatens to sue a defendant for trade secret 
misappropriation, it takes the risk that the defendant may respond to 
the threat by disclosing the trade secret.139 In 1999, the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan case Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 
for example, the defendant published trade secret materials about the 
plaintiff company on his web site after the trade secret owner threat-
ened the defendant with litigation.140 Further, if the trade secret is dis-
closed on the Internet, it could mean that the trade secret status of the 
information will be destroyed and the owner will be powerless to save it. 
To make matters worse, there may be very little satisfactory recourse 
against the defendant. Even if, at the conclusion of the litigation, the 
court finds that the defendant committed misappropriation, such a 
holding may be of little comfort to the plaintiff. This is especially so in 
the majority of cases where defendants cannot afford to pay damages. 
Indeed, the fact that the person threatening to disclose the information 
is placed in a more powerful position relative to the trade secret holder 
who is relatively powerless to stop him may also weigh against concerns 
that trade secret litigation encroaches into the First Amendment.141 
                                                                                                                      
137 See Graves, supra note 127, ¶ 2. 
138 See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text. 
139 Litigation may also draw attention to the trade secret. Depending on the nature of 
the trade secret, news reports about the litigation or the threat of litigation may raise 
awareness about and generate greater interest in discovering the secret. 
140 67 F. Supp. 2d 745, 747–48 (E.D. Mich. 1999). The plaintiff also accused the defen-
dant of soliciting misappropriated trade secrets. Id. at 748. 
141 See generally Solove & Richards, supra note 50. 
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2. Exposing the Trade Secret 
  Another major concern for plaintiffs is the protection of their con-
fidential information during discovery and litigation.142 Without reason-
able safeguards to protect confidentiality, trade secret status of the in-
formation may be lost in the litigation process. The public nature of the 
court system can be dangerous when information needs to be kept se-
cret. To that end, the parties may agree to protect the information or the 
court may issue a protective order. Depending on the arrangement, 
there may be varying levels of protection, such as designating the infor-
mation for “attorneys’ eyes only,” or ordering that it be sealed. In some 
cases, the court could also appoint a special master or disinterested ex-
pert to hear secret information and report conclusions to the court. De-
spite these various precautions, however, the risk of loss does not disap-
pear. In the end, the potential for loss of the trade secret is another 
practical way in which trade secret plaintiffs may be discouraged from 
filing the kinds of actions that would concern free speech advocates. 
3. Costs of Litigation 
 In addition to the possible risks to a trade secret described above, 
the actual cost of filing and maintaining a trade secret misappropria-
tion action is very high. On average it costs more than $700,000 to liti-
gate a trade secret case through trial, and that average can easily climb 
to $1 million in larger stakes cases.143 The fact-intensive nature of these 
cases requires thorough investigation during both pre-litigation and 
discovery. Moreover, because of the injunctive process, the initial cost 
to a trade secret misappropriation plaintiff is greater than the mere 
cost of filing a complaint. Instead, plaintiffs must bear the costs associ-
ated with temporary restraining order hearings and briefs, expedited 
discovery, and preliminary injunction hearings and briefs. Accordingly, 
the decision to proceed with this kind of action is not one to be made 
lightly, especially if the value of the information does not warrant it. 
 There are also a variety of indirect litigation costs that may detract 
from the plaintiff’s business activities. Key employees with relevant 
                                                                                                                      
142 Pooley, supra note 43, § 10.01[4] (“An irony of trade secret litigation is that the 
process itself may cause a further or different loss of trade secrets.”). 
143 A 2001 survey of the American Intellectual Property Law Association calculated that 
litigation costs for claims between $1 million and $25 million average $699,000 and “when 
more than $25 million dollars is at risk, the average litigation costs reach . . . $1.01 mil-
lion.” Kevin M. Lemley, I’ll Make Him an Offer He Can’t Refuse: A Proposed Model for Alternative 
Dispute Resolution in Intellectual Property Disputes, 37 Akron L. Rev. 287, 311 & n.164 (2004). 
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knowledge and information will likely need to devote a substantial 
amount of time to the investigation and discovery process as the litiga-
tion continues. Other employees may also be distracted by litigation, 
whether through casual discussions in the hallways or by conflicts over 
possible support for the former-coworker-turned-defendant. This kind 
of sideline participation by employees can negatively affect employee 
morale and productivity. In addition, companies who sue for trade se-
cret theft may have difficulty recruiting employees.144 Similarly, an even 
greater concern for plaintiffs may be jeopardizing their relationships 
with third parties who are important to their business. Customers, ven-
dors, or even investors may need to become involved in the litigation as 
reluctant witnesses, and the mere mention of the trade secret misap-
propriation may cause the company to suffer a loss in stock value.145 
V. Application to the Scientology Cases 
 Having laid out arguments why existing procedural, substantive, 
and practical considerations appear adequate to curtail encroachment 
on free speech values, I will now apply the arguments to the most prob-
lematic kind of scenario—the Scientology cases presented at the be-
ginning of this Article.146 On the one hand, the Scientology cases are 
extreme in many ways, making them poster cases for why something 
may need to be done to fix the many flaws and areas vulnerable to 
abuse in trade secret litigation. On the other hand, the fact that they 
are unusual makes them anomalous and not representative of the ma-
jority of trade secret misappropriation cases. It is atypical, for example, 
that a plaintiff’s express purpose, and indeed its business and legal 
strategy, is to engage in these kinds of litigation tactics.147 
 As this Article suggests, and as some of the Scientology cases them-
selves illustrate, proper application of procedural and substantive rules 
should weed out this type of abusive trade secret litigation. Early on in 
                                                                                                                      
144 Alan Hyde, Professor, Rutgers School of Law, Economic Analysis of Labor and Em-
ployment Law in the New Economy: Proceedings of the 2008 Annual Meeting, Association 
of American Law Schools, Section on Law and Economics ( Jan. 5, 2008), in 12 Emp. Rts. 
& Emp. Pol’y J. 327, 330 (2008). 
145 Id. at n.10 (citing Chris Carr & Larry Gorman, The Revictimization of Companies by the 
Stock Market Who Report Trade Secret Theft Under the Economic Espionage Act, 57 Bus. Law. 25 
(2001)). 
146 See supra notes 3–16 and accompanying text. 
147 Scientology’s approach to its trade secret misappropriation claims can be traced to its 
founder, L. Ron Hubbard, who believed that the law should be used to “harass and discour-
age rather than to win.” See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma (Lerma II ), 908 F. Supp. 1362, 1368 
(E.D. Va. 1995). 
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the Scientology cases, courts granted the plaintiff the benefit of the 
doubt, issuing temporary restraining orders and holding preliminary 
injunction hearings.148 But most of the temporary restraining orders 
were later dismissed, and most preliminary injunctions were either de-
nied or overturned on appeal.149 Scientology was also granted initial writs 
of seizure in several of its trade secret misappropriation claims.150 This 
allowed the plaintiff to enter the defendant’s home with the force of the 
police and the courts, and seize books, computers, and other docu-
ments.151 These writs of seizure were all later vacated by the courts.152 
 It is troubling that it costs the accused time and money to arrive at 
the correct and just result. This may call for greater efficiency in how 
these cases are handled. As the Scott litigation demonstrates, the nu-
merous appeals and motions which are part of our broader system of 
civil procedure may result in a nine-year litigation saga.153 In the end, 
however, the court not only found Scientology’s conduct reprehensible 
enough to dismiss its claim, but it also granted one of the defendants 
$2.9 million in attorney’s fees.154 
 The Scientology experience also supports my arguments about the 
effect of practical pre-litigation considerations. Though litigants gener-
ally attempt to maintain their credibility and legitimacy before the 
court, Scientology chose to assert its trade secret misappropriation 
claims using vexatious litigation tactics. By using these tactics, Scientol-
ogy created controversy over its trade secret misappropriation claims 
and called attention to its use of the legal system. If these claims were 
filed in an attempt to silence critics and protect trade secrets, the 
church was not necessarily successful in achieving these objectives. In-
                                                                                                                      
148 See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1077 (9th Cir. 1986); Re-
ligious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.NET, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1519, 1522–23 (D. Colo. 1995); Reli-
gious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma (Lerma I ), 897 F. Supp. 260, 261 (E.D. Va. 1995); Religious Tech. 
Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs. (Netcom I ), No. C-95-20091 RMW, 1995 WL 86532, 
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 1995); Bridge Publ’ns, Inc. v. Vien, 827 F. Supp. 629, 632 (S.D. 
Cal. 1993). 
149 See Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1077; F.A.C.T.NET, 901 F. Supp. at 1527; Lerma I, 897 F. 
Supp. at 267; Netcom I, 1995 WL 86532 at *1. But see Bridge Publ’ns, 827 F. Supp. at 636. 
150 See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs. (Netcom II ), 923 F. 
Supp. 1231, 1240 (N.D. Cal. 1995); F.A.C.T.NET, 901 F. Supp. at 1522; Lerma I, 897 F. 
Supp. at 261. 
151 See Lerma II, 908 F. Supp. at 1364; Netcom II, 923 F. Supp. at 1240; F.A.C.T.NET, 901 F. 
Supp. at 1522. 
152 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma (Lerma III ), 908 F. Supp. 1353, 1362 (E.D. Va. 1995); 
Netcom II, 923 F. Supp. at 1238; F.A.C.T.NET, 901 F. Supp. at 1523. 
153 See supra notes 12–16 and accompanying text. 
154 See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Scott, Nos. 94-55781, 94-55920, 1996 WL 171443, *5, 9 
(9th Cir. 1996). 
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deed, their litigation tactics may have done more damage than benefit 
to the cloak of secrecy that Scientology fought so hard to protect. 
 Rather, the ultimate effect was to encourage Scientology’s critics to 
continue telling their stories about their interactions with the church. 
Despite being sued for trade secret misappropriation, having a tempo-
rary restraining order issued against him, and having his property 
seized, defendant Arnaldo Lerma revolted against these efforts to si-
lence him by speaking to a reporter from the Washington Post.155 After 
Scientology’s motion for attorney’s fees against Lerma was denied, 
Lerma stated “[t]he Court has declared that facts about the inner work-
ings of Scientology are not trade secrets, it supported my right to ex-
pose the Church to the Washington Post and, today, it denied the 
Church’s attempt to crush me financially. I will continue my opposition 
to the Church.”156 In the end, the church appears to have lost not only 
the cases against the defendants, but its trade secrets as well.157 
Conclusion 
 Although plaintiffs sometimes appear to use trade secret claims to 
disguise cases that are meant to silence others or to achieve anti-
competitive purposes, this Article takes the position that restrictions on 
trade secret misappropriation litigation would not be advisable. Abuse 
of the litigation process is a problem with civil litigation in general, and 
is not unique to trade secret misappropriation cases. Accordingly, if one 
were to set out to fix this problem, it would be necessary to address the 
larger backdrop, revamping the civil litigation process rather than sin-
gling out trade secret law. 
 In the meantime, an immediate, concrete, and practical step to-
ward ameliorating free speech concerns in trade secret litigation is to 
encourage all of the players in the game, namely courts and counsel, to 
understand and apply current standards and procedures with rigor and 
consistency. Courts need to: (a) ensure that plaintiffs meet their bur-
dens of proof in establishing the existence of protectible trade secrets 
and proving misappropriation; (b) tailor appropriate injunctive reme-
dies; and (c) assess penalties against plaintiffs who assert claims in bad 
faith. Defense counsel must understand substantive trade secret law 
                                                                                                                      
155 See Richard Leiby, Scientology Fiction: The Church’s War Against Its Critics—and Truth, 
Wash. Post, Dec. 25, 1994, at C1. 
156 David Masselli, Scientology Fee Request Denied in Internet Case, http://www.ler- 
manet.com/cos/press.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2009). 
157 See Lerma II, 908 F. Supp. at 1368; Netcom II, 923 F. Supp. at 1257; F.A.C.T.NET, 901 F. 
Supp. at 1526. 
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requirements and press plaintiffs to meet their burdens, especially in 
the discovery process. Proving the existence of specific trade secrets, 
particularly the steps taken to protect these alleged secrets, are often 
challenges for plaintiffs, even when their motives are legitimate. Finally, 
plaintiff’s counsel must exercise his obligations to his client and the 
court in a reasoned and informed manner. By advising clients about 
the costs and risks of trade secret litigation, conducting thorough inves-
tigations prior to filing suit, and managing the emotional objectives of 
their clients, attorneys can go a long way toward reducing the kinds of 
problematic cases that cause concern. 
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